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[ Book Review I
Closed Chambers and Closed Minds:
Some Snapshots Taken Inside the
Supreme Court
Marybeth Herald*
Reviewing Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of
the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court. By Edward
Lazarus. TIMES BOOKS, 1998. 576 pages, $27.50.
I. Introduction
Imagine getting your dream legal job and then finding out that
your workplace is filled with name calling,
1 scheming,2 screaming, 3
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1980.
1. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
OF THE Epic STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 265 (1998). Lazarus notes that
"[tihe conservatives sent one another a steady stream of messages trading information on
cases and politically incorrect witticisms or ridiculing liberal clerks and Justices in the
putdown brand of humor at which they excelled," id. and that "[t]he cabal imagined itself
to be fighting a comparable group, which they generally referred to as the 'dreaded libs."'
Id. at 266.
2. See id. at 322 ("There is a line, albeit not a bright one, between the usual clerk role
of offering one's best advice then carrying out instruction, and the darker realm of scheming
into which Patterson appeared to have strayed.").
3. See id. at 270 ("I still remember midnight screaming matches in the red-carpeted no-
man's-land between the Blackmun and Kennedy Chambers as conservative clerks declared
triumphantly that, yet again, they had found some technical reason-a lawyer's error, a quirk
of timing-for denying a stay of execution without even considering the merits of the
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factionalism,4 pettiness, 5 blood thirstiness,' some shoving as well
as other "destructive pathologies."7 Your orientation has the air
of an indoctrination at San Quentin: "Across the room we glared
at each other, eyes hooded with distrust or outright contempt. We
were veterans of the nasty fight over the [Yonkers] case. We had
been through one execution and nearly come to blows over others
narrowly averted.",8 No, the workplace is not a prison, a law firm,
nor even a law school faculty, but that Potola of our legal cul-
ture-the Supreme Court. This discovery in Closed Chambers is a
surprise to the book's protagonist because the workplace is the
Supreme Court.
Closed Chambers is a peek at the inside of the Supreme Court.
Edward Lazarus shows us some of the slides he took on his
Supreme Court clerkship. He relies upon the memories of some
fellow clerks, some Justices' papers, as well as some of the decisions
written during his term and after. The operative word is "some"
because not all the sources are revealed, nor everyone's opinion
solicited. This territory-minus some of the gossip-has been
covered in other books, and it is not a comprehensive history of
petitioner's claims.").
4. Lazarus states that "[wie started the term arguing about everything and ended it in
a silence punctuated occasionally by gloating or insults," and that "[the Justices] had split
irreparably into two caucuses, each prearranging its own position while scheming against the
other." Id. at 324.
5. Describing the conservative clerks: "The conservative clerks of the Court shouldered
heavy chips of resentment, airs of victimhood justified by numerous perceived wrongs, most
notably the tarring of Robert Bork. At the same time, they were brash, snide, dismissive and
very much feeling their oats knowing that at the Court (unlike law school), although outnum-
bered, they were ascendant-likely to have enough votes among the Justices to "win" most
of the time." Id. at 265.
6. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 269 (describing the "cabal" of conservative clerks as
pursuing a mission of "expediting executions," showing a resolve that "manifested itself in
an amazing bloodthirst, a revelry in execution reminiscent of the celebratory crowds that
years ago thronged to public hangings.").
7. Lazarus repeats the "urban legend" that Justice White "once pinioned another
Justice's clerk against a wall for drafting a particularly biting dissent from one of White's
opinions." Id. at 37. Lazarus also notes that "[o]n a physical level, [some clerks] traded
punishing fouls during our thrice weekly intramural basketball games." Id. at 274. One
afternoon "happy hour" involved a shoving match between two clerks that ended in a
courtyard fountain. Id. at 419.
Aside from the clerks' inability to play well with others, Lazarus also claims that the
Court's decision-making process was plagued by "destructive pathologies." Id. at 516
8. Id. at 263.
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even Lazarus' term there.9 Rather, it is snapshots of certain scenes
in the hot topic areas that Lazarus chose to cover, such as abortion,
the death penalty, and civil rights. Lazarus claims that he got the
inspiration for the book in 1992 during the Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings.1" Yet the book contains so much detail
that one surmises that he kept a very good diary during his
clerkship, and that the idea for a possible book was at least
subconsciously forming about the time that he interviewed for his
clerkship.
The Supreme Court performs a crucial function in our
constitutional structure. With all its acknowledged importance,
however, the system still works in mysterious ways. The petitions
are submitted, the arguments are heard, and the opinions-pages
and pages of them-come out into the public domain, but the
production process is as closely guarded as the formula for Coke
Classic. For example, another book on the Supreme Court, David
O'Brien's Storm Center, has a picture of the Justices listening to
oral argument with the caption: "The Supreme Court in session,
February 8, 1935. This is the only known photograph of the Court
in session."'" Until Peter Irons defied the Court and published its
recorded oral arguments, even these public arguments were
considered to be for the exclusive use of the Court and scholars. 2
Upset occurred again when Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers
were released to the Library of Congress shortly after his retire-
ment for use by scholars.13 Justice Brennan's release of some of
his papers involving his earlier years on the Court also angered
some Justices.14 The Supreme Court's deliberative process is not
government operating in the sunshine. 5
9. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994); DAVID
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER (1996); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992); JAMES SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER
STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995).
10. We Did Seriously Exacerbate the Divisions, NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1998, at A10
(interview with Edward Lazarus).
11. O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 151.
12. See PETER IRONS, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT (1993); O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at
150-52.
13. See O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 146-147; see generally, Maria E. Protti, Thurgood
Marshall and the Law Library, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 75, 87-91 (1994).
14. See id. at 147.
15. See generally RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PRESS (1994); BARRETT MCGURN, AMERICA'S COURT: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PEOPLE (1997).
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The Justices have an understandable desire for privacy in their
deliberations. Their working relationships would be more difficult
under the glare of a totally open court, and the increased media
attention could make the Court an even more political body. 6
Much like executive privilege, confidentiality allows the Justices to
debate ideas and issues freely and openly without worrying about
reading the details in the New York Times the next day.17 A
related problem is the value of mystique for the respect of the
institution. A fall in esteem and respect for the Court might follow
from making public the private deliberations (and sometimes petty
bickering) of the members.
Given the importance and tradition of privacy to the Court,
there have been charges of broken promises and breached
confidences, and questions about sources in Closed Chambers. The
reaction has been unfavorable. He was, after all, a trusted clerk of
the Court. The criticisms range from allegations that Lazarus
committed a crime in the use of certain information to pointing out
inaccuracies.18 The book's closest relative, The Brethren, came out
nearly two decades ago.19 It was subjected to similar criticisms,
including violated oaths and broken confidences." Dozens of
former Supreme Court clerks and perhaps some Justices apparently
shared their innermost thoughts about the Court with the most
famous investigative reporter of that time, Bob Woodward of the
Washington Post.21 Whether he cleverly ferreted the information
16. Several accounts of the hottest and most acrimonious arguments end with tempers
cooling and calm disagreement prevailing. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 9, at 76-79 (describing
exchange between Kennedy and Brennan), id. at 102-06 (describing turmoil among Justices
regarding abortion cases in the early 1970's).
17. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("[T]he importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking
process.").
18. See Richard W. Painter, "A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court," WALL ST. J.,
April 13, 1998, at A23 (suggesting that Lazarus might have violated federal law if he
removed certain documents from the Court); Christopher R. Drahozal, The "Arrogance of
Certainty": Trust, Confidentiality, and the Supreme Court, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 121 (1998);
David M. O'Brien, A Disturbing Portrait, 81 JUDICATURE 214 (1998).
19. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
20. See JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 491.
21. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 19 at 3 ("Most of the information in
this book is based on interviews with more than two hundred people, including several
Justices, more than 170 former law clerks, and several dozen former employees of the
Court.").
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out of them, or they willingly unburdened their souls, the result was
a gossipy insider's glimpse of the process that produced such
decisions as The Pentagon Papers22 and Roe v. Wade23 from the
1969 through the 1975 terms. 4
Why former clerks talk and whether they violated oaths or
codes are problems that the Supreme Court will have to solve.25
Ironically, Closed Chambers may shut down some open discussion
and debate among the Justices and may cause more cautious
interaction between clerks and Justices at the Supreme Court, lest
similar stories surface again. Indeed, there is much in this book to
make every Court participant uncomfortable. Lazarus relates
embarrassing personal details about the Justices' interactions. He
also recounts slightly frightening stories about the Court, details
that take you from the historical to case facts to argument and
through each draft and change of vote.26 Although ostensibly
written in a way that every person can understand the issues, the
length and intricacy may confine this book to a relatively small
cohort of Supreme Court watching aficionados. For the casual
student of gossip, there will be too much to slog through pages of
numbing analysis of death penalty cases to find out that a nickname
for Justice Brennan was "piggy" (because he hogged opinion
writing opportunities),27 or that Justice O'Connor was mad at
Justice Brennan for "hoodwinking" her (the details of that feud are
not given and therefore do not qualify it as either a believable story
or just juicy gossip),28 that Justice Stevens was the "FedEx Justice"
who spent much time at his condo in Florida,29 or that his col-
leagues thought Justice Kennedy a "bit of a priss."3 ° Although
these shreds of scandal invariably attract attention, they add little
22. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 19, at 139-50, 229-40.
25. See Tony Mauro, "Supreme Court Tightens Secrecy Rules for Clerks," USA TODAY,
November 9, 1998, at 1A.
26. For example, to put the death penalty argument in a context, he begins with a
recounting of the Scottsboro case, see Beecher v. Alabama, 398 U.S. 35 (1967), and links the
Court's decision in McClesky v. Kemp to a failure (both conservative and liberal) to carry
out the spirit of the Scottsboro and Brown decisions. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 216-17.
27. LAZARUS. supra note 1, at 310.
28. Id. at 277.
29. Id. at 279.
30. Id. at 251.
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to Lazarus' thesis and detract attention from his more scholarly
criticisms of the Supreme Court.
Past the workplace gossip, Lazarus makes many substantive
criticisms about the Court and particular Justices. Keeping track
of all the faults that he finds is sometimes difficult. There are two
qualities, however, that Lazarus emphasizes as the missing links in
the Court's structure over the last decade: (1) intellectual integrity
or honesty, including a healthy respect for the rule of law; and (2)
open-mindedness or a type of collegiality that would lead the
Court's members to bridge the differences among themselves.3
Closed Chambers criticizes the extreme political nature of the
positions taken by Justices in the last decade. In Lazarus' opinion,
the Justices failed to deal honestly with precedent and were rigid
and unwilling to compromise in dealing with opposing viewpoints.
Lazarus' main gripe is that many of the Justices only seem
interested in seeing their own vision embedded in the Court's
opinions. He is critical of the result-oriented, single-minded
approach of both sides on these controversial issues. They were,
to understate the case, "polarized."3 The Justices appear more
like politicians, intent upon using pure power (the rule of five) to
see their platforms implemented, rather than scholarly judges intent
upon using precedent, intellect, and reason to interpret the law.
Of course, a divided Court is not uncommon as members and
times change. Given the manner of appointment-Presidents of
different parties will attempt to appoint ideological allies-and the
controversial subjects that the Court handles, polarization may be
distressing, but it is not unexpected or uncommon.33 Rather than
siding with any particular Justice or group of Justices in these
disputes, Lazarus states that judges weigh competing cases, policies,
and facts when judging a case, and can take many legally defensible
paths. Discussions among the Justices, he suggests, would be more
productive if they worked more on the process and focused less on
the result.
31. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 6 ("It is ... an institution broken into unyielding
factions that have largely given up on a meaningful exchange of their respective views or,
for that matter, a meaningful explication or defense of their own views.").
32. Id. at 274.
33. For example, the Roosevelt Court that President Truman inherited was "badly
divided," with disputes between Justices Black and Jackson that were "deep-seated,
ideological, and personal." O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 87-88. The transition from the Warren
Court to the Burger Court was not a smooth one either. See id. at 93.
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Part II of this essay places Closed Chambers in the context of
its author, sources, and time, and analyzes the limitations that each
of these factors imposes on Lazarus' narrative. Part III examines
Lazarus' discussion of the lack of intellectual honesty and collegiali-
ty and the excess of politics at the Supreme Court. It evaluates the
claim that some members of the Court are neither candid nor
consistent in their reasoning, ignore precedent when convenient,
and are guided by results. The essay then examines: (1) the trade-
offs that must be made among consensus, candor, and consistency;
and (2) examines whether Lazarus is bothered more by the
procedures or the substance of the Court's decisions. Part IV
assesses Lazarus' proposed solution to these problems. Rather than
proposing concrete reforms, the book advocates change from within
"the souls of the Justices." 34 Despite general pleas for more
collegiality, candor, and consistency, Lazarus does not make a
convincing case that adopting any specific methodology for deciding
cases at the Supreme Court level will change the results or make
them more palatable.
II. Setting the Scene at the Supreme Court
A. Soldiers and Generals on a Battlefield-Clerking at the
Supreme Court Is War
When Edward Lazarus begins his clerkship with Justice
Blackmun in 1988, we are presented with his picture of the young,
ambitious idealist, book smart enough to be on Yale Law Review
and street smart enough to get some banal, and not necessarily
helpful, advice from a network of clerk buddies about what to
expect when he is interviewed by Justice Blackmun (call him Mr.
Justice, he will wear a cardigan, and he will tell you he might die
during your clerkship). Lazarus is no dummy. Yet he claims
genuine surprise when he finds himself a foot soldier on a battle-
field, rather than a law clerk diligently ferreting out the law from
great stacks of learned texts and volumes of court decisions. That
the political nature of the Supreme Court escaped his notice before
he walked into the Court is difficult to believe, although the
34. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 518.
19981
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
"guerrilla war" he found may have been more malevolent,
personal, and pronounced than he expected.35
The two warring sides (for simplicity, called the conservatives
and the liberals, but with characteristics of the Montagues and the
Capulets) never even consider a truce during Lazarus' enlistment.
Rather, they spend their time trying to capture several strategic
sites-abortion, affirmative action, the death penalty, and habeas
corpus-and wooing neutral parties for skirmishes and forays to
extend their territory in these areas.36 The vision of war and
battle are conjured up by such chapter titles as "Robert Bork and
the Civil War," "A Fragile Peace," and "Old Battle, New Wounds."
Even the book's subtitle-"The First Eyewitness Account of the
Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court" makes one think of a
lone battlefield survivor recounting horrors unknown to the outside
world.
The "this is like a war" simile is too much, but it does reflect
the image of a survivor who apparently went in an idealist and
came out a realist, with idealized notions of reform. Although his
stories support a critical legal studies view of the Court, Lazarus
claims he is less cynical. At the end, he acts more appalled, with
an attitude of "does anyone else know what goes on here because
we need to do something about it." The clash between cynicism
and idealism recalls the courtroom scene in the movie "A Few
Good Men" in which the young Navy lawyer demands of the battle
worn Marine general, "I want the truth," and the general snarls
back, "You can't handle the truth." The questions here are
whether we have the truth in Lazarus' account, and if so, does
Lazarus know how to handle it.
B. Assessing the Battlefield Reports
As with all eyewitness testimony, we have to evaluate the
testimony and the sources in context. Two of the issues to consider
35. See id. at 261 ("But nothing in this crash course and nothing in law school and
nothing in my imagination prepared us for the tidal wave of politically charged cases that
term, or for the depth of the moral, philosophical, and personal schisms that divided the
Justices, or for the guerrilla war that liberal and conservative clerks conducted, largely out
of sight of those Justices, to control the course of constitutional law.").
36. See id. at 44 ("Once Justice Scalia distributed his memo identifying the Yonkers case
as potentially useful for reshaping the prevailing legal landscape, the vote on the stay
applications inevitably developed into a kind of quickie litmus test for a Justice's allegiance
in the escalating civil war over the Court's purpose and identity.").
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here are: (1) the limited number and nature of informants for the
book; and (2) the particular viewpoint and politics of the author,
which is clerk-centered and moderately liberal.
1. The Sources-The limitations in Lazarus' account are: (1)
the sources are non-representative; (2) the sources are often
anonymous; and (3) the sources address only a limited number of
cases. Part of the context is examining how Lazarus gathered his
information. Lazarus uses the notes and papers of some Justices,
his own personal experience, and the experience of some former
law clerks and other sources, although it is doubtful that Lazarus
solicited memories of the "cabalists"-as Lazarus not so fondly
refers to several conservative clerks.
The problems are apparent. We do not know if he has a
representative or trustworthy sample of sources. That the sources
are anonymous impedes a genuine assessment of credibility.
Moreover, clerks also get only a limited glimpse into the Court.
Their life experience may be limited, their term at the Court is
short, and their immediate frame of reference is their Justice.
37
They might form attachments to their Justice that lead to a more
critical view of other chambers, especially ones that might disagree
with their Justice. In short, the clerk's perch does not provide an
unobstructed view of the situation.
Lazarus also does not have a representative sample of the
Justices' papers, only the papers of Marshall and Brennan, who are
both dead, and who happened to be liberals. That also may skew
the narrative. He does rely, however, on the work of other
scholars. Some of the stories he tells are also told in other
accounts, but with different slants on the same facts.
38
2. The Reporter's Viewpoint-Besides relying upon an
unrepresentative sample of informants, Lazarus is looking at the
situation through his own prism, and his prose reflects that fact.
Examining his perspective allows us to better evaluate his account.
To fit within his themes, he inflates the importance of the year he
clerked, and he emphasizes the role of the clerks and a bitter
liberal-conservative divide on the Court.
37. Lazarus notes this limitation in the context of criticizing the Justices for relying on
their clerks too much in their decision making. See id. at 273.
38. See, e.g., JEFFRIES, supra note 9; O'BRIEN, supra note 9; SIMON, supra note 9.
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a. The Time-First, Lazarus has such an exaggerated view of
the 1988 term that it undermines his credibility. He compares it
with the 1937 term, when the court reversed course on the New
Deal, and the 1954 term, when it decided Brown v. Board of
Education.39 Despite his claim that the 1988 term saw "more
landmark decisions in more fields of law than in any other year in
history,"4° 1988 was not remotely remarkable. Although the
Court decided one abortion case, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Service,41 that case subsequently was knocked out of many
Constitutional Law texts when Casey v. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania42 was decided in 1992. In contrast, the
1937 decisions and Brown are still in the textbooks. Fame is
generally fleeting in Constitutional Law-a problem that Lazarus
repeatedly points out in the context of criticizing the manipulation
of precedent on the Court. Most terms have some surprises and
casualties, and the damage sometimes takes years to assess.
Without agonizing over the details, suffice it to say that 1988 was
not the best of times, nor the worst of times. It was not uninterest-
ing, but nothing cataclysmic happened.
Abortion, the death penalty, civil rights-these are the topics
that the Supreme Court routinely covers these days. To character-
ize 1988 as an unusual year is to place the Supreme Court outside
its historical context as the focal point of the hot issues of the
times. Despite his statement to the contrary, Lazarus seems to
understand this point as well because only a portion of the book is
devoted to the actual events of the 1988 term. He uses historical
context throughout his book and talks at length about many
important cases that occurred before and after 1988. Lazarus
exaggerates that term's place in Supreme Court history because it
fits within the "epic" theme, and he cannot be an "eyewitness" to
anything that happened outside that term.
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lazarus states:
It is fair to day, I believe, that during October term 1988 the Court handed down
more landmark decisions in more fields of law than in any other year in its history
and that the term must rank with the New Deal Watershed of 1937 and the year
of Brown, 1954, as the most decisive of the century.
LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 261-62.
40. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 261-62.
41. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Moreover, to see only these controversial issues as defining the
Supreme Court is inaccurate as well. After reading Lazarus' book,
one thinks that all the Supreme Court handles is death penalty
cases, abortion, affirmative action cases, and habeas petitions. The
focus is narrow. Closed Chambers is bereft of stories of blood
spilled over tax, social security, or admiralty cases. But those topics
are deadly boring and do not make good copy. For example, it is
not clear that the outcome of any ERISA case caused any
heartache, plotting, or general agitation at the court. To fit the
court into the "war" analogy, he makes much of the liberal-
conservative divide, without a meaningful center.43 Whether that
stark conservative-liberal split exists in the majority of cases that
the Supreme Court decides every year is not clear from his account.
One critical point that Lazarus makes is that the death penalty
bitterly divided the Court, and these cases may have affected the
Justices' relationships in other areas as well as "destroy[ing] the
integrity of the courts." 44 By Lazarus' account, the death penalty
cases caused bitter struggles among clerks that were personal,
political, and ideological. With both the clerks and Justices, the
pressures and tensions of the death penalty cases so infected the
Court that the bitterness may have spilled over and contaminated
the entire decisional process. 45 The large number of petitions the
Court handled, the last minute and emergency nature of the
petitions, and the stark reality that execution was imminent for the
petitioner make these highly emotional and difficult cases.
Ironically, by chronicling these incidents before, during, and after
the "historic" 1988 term, Lazarus attests to a problem that is not
unique, but part of a long and agonizing struggle for the Court.'
43. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 262 ("The more fundamental similarities [between
the 1988-89 term court and the present one] are internal: the virtual disappearance of a
meaningful center in favor of two sharply divided wings, the emergence of either Kennedy
or O'Connor (depending on the area of law) as the controlling vote in almost every
politically charged case, and the perpetuation of a Court culture that suffers from the same
accusatory and uncompromising spirit of faction that now poisons American political society
at large.").
44. Id. at 509.
45. The infection extends to relationships with the Courts of Appeal, including a particu-
larly bitter battle with the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 505-509.
46. In 1986, the California Supreme Court suffered its own problems over the emotions
raised by the death penalty when three justices suffered defeat in judicial retention elections.
Their defeat was linked to a political backlash against perceived obstructionism of the
operation of the death penalty. See generally Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention
Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL.
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b. The Role of the Clerks-Supporting Cast or Main Charac-
ters?-Lazarus' book contains a theme of mismanaged, overzealous
law clerks, who do much of the Court's work. That story is
centered in 1988, and "during October Term '88 the vast majority
of opinions the Court issued were drafted exclusively by clerks."47
Lazarus believes that the clerks have a great deal of influence,
more influence than they should.48 The latter point would be
undeniable if in fact the clerks exclusively drafted the vast majority
of opinions. Beyond claiming that the clerks' worst trait is that
they produce wordy and heavily footnoted opinions that the
Justices do not bother to understand, edit, or cut enough, although
he is critical of those practices,49 Lazarus also claims several clerks
are not just law researchers, but zealous advocates of particular
conservative causes.
The clerks exercise considerable power through the Justices'
participation in a certiorari pool, with eight Justices being influ-
enced by the initial judgment of the clerk who works on that
petition." The problem is that with so many chambers participat-
ing in the certiorari pool, the safety net provided by individual
review of these certiorari petitions is lost. The power over the
grant of certiorari is initially delegated to a young, inexperienced,
short-time, perhaps partisan, recent law school graduate. It is a
somewhat frightening picture because it is one in which the Justices
L. REV. 2007 (1988).
47. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 271.
48. Lazarus describes a Court "where Justices yield great and excessive power to imma-
ture, ideologically driven clerks, who in turn use that power to manipulate their bosses and
the institution they ostensibly serve." Id. at 6. As Lazarus notes:
Certainly, the ultimate power to grant or deny a stay rested with the
Justices. Still, when the final arguments reached the Court, the Justices were
almost always long since home for the night, isolated from the tall stacks of paper
in which the crucial elements of the case lay buried. The Justices counted on their
clerks to distill for them the essence of the case, the facts, the issues, and the
precedents that should inform their vote. They relied on us for advice.
Id. at 122-23. Lazarus also notes:
I can say with certainty that Rehnquist's mild suggestion of unconscious liberal
bias in the cert. process does not even begin to capture either the very significant
power that clerks wielded at the Court during my time (and in several years
subsequent) or the very conscious and abusive manner in which clerks wielded
that power for partisan political ends.
Id. at 263. He notes further Kennedy's clerks conniving on stays of execution, and how to
get a vote against a stay. See id. at 270.
49. See id. at 272-73.
50. See id. at 263.
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may never be exposed to the arguments for or against certiorari
because they are filtered through the clerk.
Past the certiorari process, a clerk's influence is tempered
because the Justices have access to the briefs and arguments of
both parties. Memos to and from the Justices are circulated with
a variety of viewpoints." Lazarus notes that for some of the
clerks their Justice's vote was inevitable. 2  There are other
examples of clerks being unable to persuade their Justice to take
a particular position or disapproved of the opinion of their Justice,
and this is perhaps the best evidence that the Justices are not sold
anything that they do not want to buy.53 Certainly other books
about the Justices portray less clerk-centered scenarios,54 although
criticism of reliance on clerks has been voiced by other commenta-
tors.5
Lazarus often names the clerks that he feels overstepped their
bounds, and they are the conservative clerks. He is direct, pointed,
and personal in his criticism of them.56 It is one of the ironies of
the book that in criticizing the Justices for their failures to bridge
chasms between ideological differences, he certainly contributes to
the divisiveness by singling out these clerks in a very public way
and detailing his opinion of their personal and professional
failings.57 If they were to return fire in the same way, it would
lead to the same situation he condemns among the Justices. The
only difference is that at least until now, it is a one-sided war of
words.
The clerks' influence was highest with certain conservative, but
sometimes centrist Justices, including Kennedy and O'Connor.58
51. See id. at 63-64.
52. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 123.
53. See, e.g., id. at 202 (noting that clerks for other conservative Justices were not
successful in arguing that death penalty study should be given more "careful attention"), 207
(noting Justice Powell's opinion of the court in McClesky was, for most of the clerks, "an
obvious failure of logic and craft.").
54. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 243-562; SIMON, supra note 9.
55. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 271-72.
56. See id. at 264-75.
57. For example, he specifically names the three conservative clerks who engaged in the
"machinations" culminating in Kennedy's vote switch in Patterson. See id. at 314-15.
Although he is equally critical of Brennan in Patterson, he notes that Justice Brennan
rewrote his opinion in a "transparently insincere" manner, id. at 316, in order to gain a
dishonest tactical advantage "at a clerk's suggestion" without specifically naming the clerk,
id.
58. See id. at 270, 274.
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Lazarus portrayed several clerks as manipulative lagos in the
chambers of some Justices. Primarily Justice Kennedy in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union59 and generally,6 ° and Justice O'Connor
in Webster and Richmond v. Croson.61 Some clerks plant ideas in
the Justices' heads and connive to achieve their desired result.62
"Some" is the operative word as there are stories of other clerks
who refrain or restrain themselves from pressing cases with their
Justices-they are often the ones who are, in Lazarus' opinion, in
the right.63
Yet ultimately, Lazarus does not know exactly how the Justices
arrived at their conclusions. Kennedy and O'Connor were open to
persuasion (a positive quality) and looking for consensus (another
positive quality) or perhaps just looking for a justification for their
desired result. He relates stories of Justices inviting clerks to
debate the issues before oral argument to bring out the problems,
differences, and possible approaches. 4  The role of intellectual
sounding board seems like a good use of clerk time. Although
Lazarus at times seems to be extremely critical of some conserva-
tive clerks, Lazarus lays most of the blame for poorly reasoned
decisions on the Justices, which is where it belongs. 65 They sign
their opinions and receive the criticism. Nor would one expect any
Justice to lay responsibility for a decision at the clerk's door.
But the idea of an on-the-scene, powerful advocate continually
pressing one's cause is disturbing, especially because Lazarus
portrays it as deliberate partisan manipulation. Conservative clerks
infiltrate not only their assigned chambers, but those of other
Justices. Right or wrong, Lazarus' tale of miscreant clerks touches
a nerve. The clerks are operating within a fundamentally non-
representative body with a closed deliberative process. The
59. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
60. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 314-16, 322 ("[Flormer clerks consider [Kennedy]
one of the more 'clerk-driven' Justices."), 394-95 ("[l]n the minds of his clerks, [Kennedy]
always held out at least the possibility of being persuaded ... .
61. See id. at 273-274, 300, 391-393.
62. See id. at 314-15 (detailing the attempts of the "cabalists" clerks to sway Justice
Kennedy's vote in the Patterson case).
63. See, e.g., id. at 201-02.
64. See id. at 394.
65. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 300 ("The argument in [Richmond v. Croson] that
[O'Connor] adopted was a favorite of Federalist Society members, developed the previous
year by their guru Judge Alex Kozinski ... and cleverly deployed by O'Connor's cabalist
clerk. But her acquiescence in its use was a matter of pure convenience, not conviction.").
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suggestion that they are manipulating the votes behind the scenes
can carry weight precisely because we have no idea what goes on
beyond the scenes.
On the other hand, clerks are also just one aspect of "outside"
influence in the Court's work, meaning outside the briefs, the
arguments, and the case law. Perhaps this theory is best illustrated
by a story of one clerk's lack of influence. Justice Powell's clerk,
during deliberations on the Bowers v. Hardwick66 case, did not
disclose to Powell that the clerk was gay, letting Powell claim in the
middle of the deliberations that he did not know anyone who was
gay. Whether the clerk did not want to reveal his sexual orienta-
tion to Powell for personal reasons or did not think he should
influence Powell's decision by such disclosure, the situation
presented an untouched opportunity to confront Powell and to
force him to make a more honest decision. Ultimately, Powell
provided the fifth vote to hold that criminal prosecutions of
consensual homosexual sodomy were not unconstitutional, although
he concocted a potential Eighth Amendment argument that future
litigants could try to sell to four other members of the Court. He
later regretted the vote.67
What if the clerk had told Powell of homosexuality and Powell
had an epiphany that changed his vote sooner rather than later?
Would the result be more frightening than his subsequent regret
because the decision would have rested on a single clerk's influ-
ence? It is frightening that Powell's biography credits his under-
standing of the problems of restrictive abortion laws to conversa-
tions with his daughters and to his knowledge that a messenger in
his law firm had helped someone get an abortion and she died as
a result.68 To realize that some law is based on chance anecdotal
experience, or on a form of judicial narrative is frightening. For
advocates, the influence of personal experience is hidden from
view, difficult to ferret out, figure out, and defend against.
Academics and advocates waver between ignoring and acknowledg-
ing this invisible influence.
66. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
67. See JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 530.
68. See id. at 347; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 367 ("The incident convinced Powell that
women would seek abortions regardless of the law.").
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Although Lazarus focuses on the clerk influence, the broader
fear is that Supreme Court decisions are driven by anecdotes,
intuition, and political views of the Justices and clerks. The clerks'
own life experiences and perspectives potentially become part of
the limited mix that produces those decisions. The clerks them-
selves are drawn from a narrow pool of society.69 The larger
problem may be that some of the Justices make their decisions
based on their own sometimes lopsided life experiences, including
interactions with clerks, spouses, and children.70  Even empirical
data is filtered through this prism.71 It is no surprise that judicial
biographies focus attention on the Judge's background, personality,
and experience, trying to explain how this combination produced
that particular judge. In contrast, the actual decisions of the judge
are generally focused on case precedent with no hint that personal
experience had any role in the decision.
Both the claim that 1988 was an extraordinary year and the
claim that the clerks' influence was too decisive in some cases may
just be part of the overall tone of an "epic" account. In a manner,
it is not unlike an "inside the beltway" account of life in which one
either is the most influential person in Washington, D.C. or works
for the most influential person in Washington, D.C. The subtitle,
after all, is "The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles
Inside the Supreme Court," for a reason. It is far more marketable
than "One Clerk's Version of Some Everyday Struggles Inside the
Supreme Court."
69. See Tony Mauro, The hidden power behind the Supreme Court Justices give pivotal
role to novice lawyers, USA TODAY, March 13, 1998, at 12A (noting that the majority of
Supreme Court clerks are graduates of elite law schools, white, male, and young). Lazarus
notes that to get a Supreme Court clerkship, you need to get "a letter of recommendation
from at least one professor (usually a former clerk) who is 'plugged in' to the clerkship
network" LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 19. So the system perpetuates itself.
70. Lazarus notes how the personal experiences of the Justices often influenced their
decisions. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 35 (Stevens on flag burning), 66, 107, 147, 214-15
(Marshall on racial bias), 135 (Rehnquist on the death penalty), 300 (O'Connor on state's
rights), 367 (Powell on abortion), 367-68, 380 (Blackmun on abortion), 384, 501 (O'Connor
on abortion and habeas), 386 (Powell on homosexuality).
71. Lazarus points this out in his criticism of Justice Powell and his alleged "statistical
know-nothingness" approach to a study indicating application of the death penalty was race-
based. Id. at 207, 211 (criticizing Justice Powell's approach in McKleskey v. Kemp). In
Lazarus' opinion, the study showed that Powell's vision of "southern progress" was a myth,
which was too much cognitive dissonance for Powell to accept. That caused him to find a
way to ignore the study. See id. at 200-01.
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c. The Justices-Heroic Figures or Mere Mortals?-Lazarus
criticizes all the Justices on the Court, except perhaps Justices
Souter and Harlan. According to Lazarus, the conservatives are
heartless,72 the liberals are headless, and the center is direction-
less. Lazarus seems embittered towards the liberal members of the
Court because they achieve results with which he agrees, but on
what he believes to be indefensible grounds. Unlike James P.
Simon's position in his recent book, The Center Holds, Lazarus
expresses no admiration of the liberal members of the Court.73
Lazarus' account is critical of Brennan and Marshall and blames
them for many of the failures in the period he surveys. Lazarus
cannot hide his frustration with the Court's loss of the strength of
its liberal members to illness and age (Brennan and Marshall),
Florida (Stevens), and the library (Blackmun).74 On the other
hand, the conservatives were enjoying a Renaissance, led by the
"witty, brilliant, and self-satisfied" Scalia.75 What comes across
-accurately or not-is a portrayal of the conservative Justices as
smart, sharp, and energetic, and the liberal Justices as old,
politically out-of-touch, and cantankerous.
Lazarus reflects this viewpoint in recounting events. Consider
his account of the assignment of the majority opinion in the
Patterson case.76 This case caused a stir because the Supreme
Court ordered oral argument to reconsider a key precedent (the
Runyon case) interpreting a civil rights statute. It looked as if the
conservatives on the Court were headed for a frontal assault on
basic liberal bases. The liberals would not go down without a
battle, however, and part of that battle was a fight for the heart
and mind of the newly appointed Justice Kennedy. Surprisingly,
72. The conservatives' attitude toward the death penalty, for example, was: "Let's get
it over with." Id. at 160.
73. James F. Simon takes us on a tour of the same court and covers much of the same
ground, but without some of the more gossipy material gleaned by Lazarus. The cases the
two authors examine are almost the same-the Patterson racial discrimination claim, the Roe
and Casey abortion cases, the McClesky case. The internal and confidential memoranda they
cite are the same in many cases, but the interpretation of what happened on the same facts
are sometimes very different. Simon also does not emphasize the clerks' alleged over
involvement in opinion writing and in-fighting. See generally, SIMON, supra note 9.
74. See id. at 275-279, 351.
75. Id. at 279. Lazarus describes Rehnquist, in contrast to his predecessor Burger as
"brainy, a quick thinker with a straightforward, easygoing manner that smoothed his
sometimes jagged-edged written opinions." Id. at 191.
76. See id. at 309-21.
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after the Court's initial conference, he seemed capable of reaching
a truce that would uphold the precedent. Justice Brennan, ranking
member of the conference majority, got to assign the opinion. As
Lazarus tells it:
[Patterson] seemed ideally suited for Earl Warren's favorite
opinion assignment strategy of protecting a bare majority by
giving the writing assignment to its least certain member. If
Brennan harbored doubts about Kennedy's commitment at
conference, the surest way to keep Kennedy's vote would be to
let him draft the opinion. Even if not, given the Court's deep
divisions and the inevitable pressure on Kennedy to return to
the conservative fold, prudence alone argued strongly for giving
him the assignment. But Brennan had not earned the nickname
Piggy by handing off big cases for others to write. He returned
from conference enthusiastic about Kennedy's support and
decided to write Patterson himself.7
This account is hardly flattering to Justice Brennan. Consider,
however, the same story with a different spin from a different
author, James Simon in The Center Holds:
As the senior justice in the majority (on both the Runyon
and Patterson issues), Brennan was entitled to assign the
majority opinion. He decided to give the assignment to himself,
drawing on his vast experience to try, once again, to produce a
majority opinion that would support his expansive vision of civil
rights and liberties protections under the Constitution and
federal statutes.
78
It is a matter of perspective. One author interprets the facts
as self-indulgence; the other author portrays Justice Brennan a
grand master executing a grand plan.79
77. Id. at 310.
78. SIMON, supra note 9, at 49. Again, in contrast to this glowing tone, Lazarus notes
in discussing Brennan's role in Roe v. Wade: "Brennan goaded the Court in spasmodic leaps
toward his vision of the Constitution as an ever-expanding charter for achieving social
justice." LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 369.
79. Lazarus also faults Brennan and liberal law clerks for a messy resolution in
Patterson. Lazarus claims:
His clerks, as liberal or more liberal than the Justice himself, had a tin ear
for phrasing arguments in ways that might appeal to a potential conservative ally.
Even when they tried to be cautious and noncontroversial, from the conservative
perspective, they overreached. And, in Patterson, they weren't even trying. The
draft was laced with modes of argument and rhetorical flourishes about the
Court's commitment to fighting discrimination that were characteristic of
[Vol. 103:1
1998] CLOSED CHAMBERS AND CLOSED MINDS
Simon sees the liberals holding together a coalition; Lazarus
sees them as generally losing it. It is important to Simon's thesis
that the liberals are seen as holding together the coalition. Lazarus
uses the liberals' alleged foibles as part of his thesis that both sides
of the ideological debate are in need of counseling, need to deal
more honestly with the questions before them, and to be more
collegial with each other. The point of his book is that the liberals
are as dogmatic and zealous as the conservatives, and that both
sides in the war are at fault.8° If he had accused only one side of
the debate with possessing these qualities, critics would dismiss him
as an ideologue on the losing side of an ideological war. Instead,
he attempts to come off as even-handed in his criticism, without an
ax to grind.
As to his own ideological orientation, Lazarus places himself
in the moderate liberal camp, very much like Justice Blackmun, the
Justice for whom he clerked.81 On the death penalty, for example,
Lazarus criticizes the so-called abolitionists82 for their extreme,
Brennan's grand style but sent chills down conservative spines.
LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 310 (citation omitted).
On the other hand, Simon, in The Center Holds, describes the same draft in a different
manner:
Brennan devoted the first two-thirds of this draft opinion to the issue on
which there was Court unanimity-the reaffirmation of Runyon v. McCrary.
Brennan emphasized the established rule that the Court should not overrule
precedents that interpret congressional statutes, since Congress had the power to
correct interpretations that it did not approve of. Brennan laid out all the
exceptions to this rule, all of the times when the Court should overrule congressio-
nal statutes, and then demonstrated why the Court had reaffirmed, not overruled,
Runyon.
He concluded the section on the conspicuously cautious note that his clerk
had suggested in his Patterson memorandum: although the Runyon majority's
interpretation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was not the only acceptable interpreta-
tion of the statute, it was at the very least "plausible." And given the Court's
respect for precedent, a "plausible" statutory interpretation by the Court,
untouched by a later congressional amendment or statute, should be preserved.
SIMON, supra note 9, at 55-56.
80. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 210 ("So it was even in a case as fundamental and
difficult as McClesky. From start to finish, each side operated as if enclosed in its own
cocoon. An 'odd silence' descended over the case, one clerk recalls. It was the silence of
mutual scorn.").
81. See id. at 266.
82. See id. at 114 (criticizing a death penalty opponent as a "fanatic" for failing to
concede in oral argument that there may be some crimes-like blowing up New York City
with a hydrogen bomb-for which the death penalty might be appropriate.). Lazarus states:
I didn't become convinced that any particular murderer "deserved" to die or even
that the death penalty was a good idea. But I did lose the capacity to believe that
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uncompromising positions. Maintaining balance, he takes pains to
describe some of the horrible acts that led to the sentence, while
concluding that the defendant did not intentionally commit
murder.83 He also states, however, that he saw prosecutorial and
judicial misconduct aplenty, and "chronic ineptitude of defense
counsel," that made imposition of the penalty problematic in a
number of cases that he saw.' He does not really detail any case
in which he saw the death penalty as legitimate; a case in which
there was no constitutional error. He places himself far from the
conservative Justices who cannot honorably apply precedent
especially when it might result in overturning a death sentence,85
and clerks who seem to carve notches in their desks every time it
is inflicted. In other words, his aversion to the death penalty was
not unthinking or wholesale, but he never seems to have seen a
case in which it was fairly meted out. This attitude is very similar
to the position he later ascribes to the Justice that he clerked
for-Justice Blackmun.86
III. Character Flaws That Lead to the Supreme Court's Troubles
Having examined Lazarus' perspective, one moves on to the
purpose of the Lazarus story. Lazarus' point is that the quality of
justice suffered because of a lack of intellectual candor and
consistency and the absence of the meaningful exchange of ideas in
the Supreme Court during the last decade. The Court became
unable to reach a "collective judgment, to deliberate on the
nation's fundamental values and beliefs, and to translate those
values and beliefs into a coherent rule of law."8" Lazarus suggests
change, but that change seems possible only if it begins in the
the death penalty was evil per se, that because of some abstract ideal of human
dignity, under no circumstances could the state extinguish a life. Some human
conduct was that terrible. I saw it every week.
Id. at 125.
83. See id. at 50, 72, 124-25.
84. See id. at 126-29.
85. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 209-210 (claiming that in the Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987), Supreme Court precedent in the form of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982) required reversal, but conservatives tampered with the precedent to achieve the
desired result because the "conservatives had no compunction about bending old law a bit
to usher [the defendants] on their way.").
86. See id. at 161 ("But Blackmun's compulsive methodology also caused him to reflect
almost daily on the awful responsibility of overseeing the taking of a life and made him
increasingly concerned with the chronic irregularities he saw in the system.").
87. Id. at 165.
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hearts and minds of the Justices.88 The problem is that Lazarus'
goals of a collegial or collective process and consistent, honest
decisions are sometimes in conflict with each other. Moreover,
Lazarus does not specify exactly how the ideal process would work.
Instead, he argues that flaws in the current process lead to
decisions that are flawed. Yet, he is unable to show how changing
the process would improve the quality of justice or decisions.
A. Defining the Problems and the Problems with the Definitions
1. The Lack of Intellectual Integrity-In expecting honesty of
the Justices, Lazarus expected the Justices to wrestle with the
difficult and to acknowledge the complex. Instead, he found the
Justices content to manipulate the difficult issues and to overlook
complexity. This criticism is based on his premise that there is no
"right" approach to Constitutional interpretation.89 Accepting
that there is no right method, there must be a "decency of
process," and "trust and belief in mutual good faith":9"
There must be a sense that both sides are advancing legal argu-
ments because they believe in them deeply and not as a
stratagem for imposing their will on the law. There must be a
sense that reasons matter more than results. The power to
interpret carries the responsibility of good faith and self-denial.
88. See id. at 518.
89. Lazarus claims:
Certainly neither the Justices nor the academics who dissect their work have ever
agreed on one. Just as Bork's jurisprudence on original intent suffered from the
inherent weakness of too closely linking the law to an unknowable part, other
modes of interpretation potentially cast the law adrift without reference to text,
history, and structure of the document that is the charter of both our government
and our liberties.
The most we can expect and what we must demand from the court as it
expounds the law is an integrity born of consistency and sincerity. Legitimate
constitutional arguments are not limitless; they may take several forms familiar to
the law. They may be based on history, on precedent, on the text, on inferences
from the way our government is structured, on appeals to ethics, or on prudential
considerations about the consequences of a decision. Often, these modes of
argument are used in combination, melded into a convincing whole. And none is
perfect for every circumstance. Deciding which modes of argument best suit the
facts and circumstances of a given case is both an inevitable moral choice and the
essence of judging.
Id. at 248-49.
90. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 249.
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When these are destroyed, nothing remains but counting votes
and the exercise of raw power.91
One problem with this theory is acceptance of the premise that
there is no right approach to interpreting the Constitution. Many
of the Justices believe deeply in the legal arguments that they are
advancing, and that is why they want to impose them on the law.
The more one feels there is a "right" and "wrong" way to interpret
the Constitution, the less one is able to abide compromising one's
approach. If those with firm commitments to certain ideological
tracts have to compromise them, the Supreme Court opinions may
then end up looking more like legislation-decorated with
paragraphs satisfying this or that Justice and somewhat incoherent
as a whole. Lazarus never adequately addresses how consensus is
reached when the Justices' positions are so far apart. He spends
time criticizing each side, but little time addressing how to bridge
the gap.
Lazarus believes that many members of the Court were hard
core ideologues in the results that they desired, but not necessarily
in their rationales.92 He does not believe that either the conserva-
tives or the liberals are wedded to a particular jurisprudence, but
that they are wedded to particular results. Lazarus' argument
about honesty in dealing with the precedent and facts is an
admirable goal for the justice system; Justices should not misuse,
mischaracterize, or ignore precedent or facts.
Nevertheless, charges of outright dishonesty are easy to make
but hard to prove, given the fluid and complex nature of legal
argument. Precedents often point in different directions and
emphasis on one or another will lead to one result or another. This
is especially true at the Supreme Court because there are so many
matters of first impression. That may explain the difference
between claims that a court is inconsistent in applying its own
91. Id.
92. He notes that:
In pursuit of their legal counterrevolution, the conservatives seemed to care
little or nothing about consistency and continuity in their use of legal doctrine or
whether their arguments held up under scrutiny. The liberals, for their part,
reached predictable results through complacent means, resting on old law even
when its foundations had been exposed as shaky or when it seemed ill-suited to
the case at hand.
Id. at 286.
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precedent and proving that claim.93 Many judicial decisions could
begin:
This is a difficult case. Precedents point in many direc-
tions. We could justify reaching the results desired by the
respondents or the petitioners by a variety of different routes.
This opinion explains the route we chose and why we believe it
is the most justifiable.
As Lazarus argues time and again, there are many cases in
which both sides could have been more honest in justifying the
result that they wanted to reach.94 Lazarus' book, like other
books and many law review articles, is devoted in part to exposing
the Court's questionable calls and leaps in logic. Dissecting and
criticizing Court opinions is a time honored pastime for legal
academics. Lazarus' own attempt to supplement his critiques with
insider stories of personality disputes on the Court may be driven
by a desire to appeal to a wider audience for material that is often
technical, dull, and complex.
Even if both sides are honest in arriving at their decision,
however, the Court may still lack consensus on the result, although
admittedly with more intellectually honest majority and dissenting
opinions. A cry for intellectual honesty-if that were the sole
target of the book-is a worthy enough goal. What Lazarus adds
to the record of criticism is a challenge for the Court to "engage in
the enterprise of acknowledging and accommodating our most
93. See Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common Law Process in the Large
Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991) The author found that evidence suggests "that
what makes appellate outcomes unpredictable, even in a large court, is not an array of
decisions pointing in different directions, but more often than not, the absence of a
precedent that is closely on point." Id. at 921.
94. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 216. For example, with regard to the death
penalty decision in McClesky v. Kemp:
The result was in a way the worst of all worlds. The Court did not advance boldly
to eradicate race discrimination in capital sentencing, even at the risk of losing the
death penalty itself. Nor, by contrast, did it retreat honestly and forthrightly (as
Justice Harlan had done long age in McGautha), conceding that the death penalty
was permissibly imperfect and too intractable a puzzle for human wisdom to solve.
Instead, the majority erected a facade of fairness and rationality, and pretended
that the potential problems recognized in Gregg had been solved. And, in so
doing, these Justices legitimized, for every participant in the death penalty system
and for the public at large-a process that, at a minimum, they should have
recognized as deeply flawed.
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passionate differences." 95  This second challenge-to reach
consensus-is certainly the more difficult of the two challenges he
presents.
2. Collegiality and Open-Mindedness-In finding intellectual
dishonesty, Lazarus critiques the reasoning of many Supreme Court
decisions. But he also attacks the process that produced them, a
process that seems lacking in institutional collegiality. Collegiality
is not the quality that makes the job nicer because the Justices and
the clerks play tennis or golf together. It is not the personal that
matters here, although Lazarus focuses in part on what an unhappy
work place the Supreme Court was on occasion. As Lazarus
phrases it, "[T]he soil of shared experience and principles, of
compromise and understanding, had washed away,"" and that
"the delicate process of collective judicial decision breaks under the
weight of unrelenting ideology and the arrogance of certainty."97
The members did not get along well enough to talk to one another
about their points of difference in resolving the various cases:
To fulfill this mission, a body of nine independent, opinionated
judges whose views in hard cases often prove irreconcilable
must above all preserve a decency of process. For the system
to work, for Justices in disagreement to achieve an exchange of
ideas, undertake a search for common ground, or even reach an
agreement respectfully to disagree, there must first be trust and
belief in mutual good faith. There must be a sense that both
sides are advancing legal arguments because they believe in
them.98
It is not the first time a suggestion for a process of deliberation
has been made and ignored. Justice Frankfurter often proposed
more formal rules to ensure adequate deliberations, but his
memorandum proposing the change-he circulated it every year for
ten years-met with a decided lack of enthusiasm.99  Some
Justices saw any proposal of specific "due deliberation" procedures
as potentially impinging on the independence of the vote of the
Justice. As Justice Douglas noted:
95. Id. at 324.
96. Id. at 72.
97. Id. at 249.
98. Id. at 9.
99. See O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 218-19.
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If we unanimously adopted rules on such matters we would
be plagued by them, bogged down and interminably delayed.
If we were not unanimous, the rules would be ineffective. I, for
one, could not agree to give anyone any more control over
when I vote than over how I vote."°
Justice Douglas does not admit that anything anyone could say
could change his vote. Nor do the current Justices themselves seem
to cry for more debate,' °' even when not much debate goes
on. 2 Two of the more conservative Justices, Justices Rehnquist
and Scalia, admitted that because the issues confronted are similar
from year to year, further talk would probably not produce
different results.0 3 Of course, their conservative views being on
the winning side of most arguments these days, they have little to
gain from further talk, and time and votes to lose. It is important,
however, that the call for more debate comes from within the
Court, because imposing it from outside the Court would likely
make it all the more unsuccessful. The Justices must want to
achieve a consensus in order to do so successfully.
There was a time when consensus could be informally
encouraged as Chief Justice Marshall did in the early days of the
Court. His methods included ensuring that all the Justices roomed
in the same boardinghouse and writing the majority of opinions
himself, even if he disagreed with the results °4  His success
reflects his own personal charisma and brilliance, qualities not
easily re-created. Such methods appear outdated and unworkable,
and had their critics even in Marshall's days. 5
100. Id. at 218.
101. See id. at 332-33 (noting that Justice Scalia has praised, in the face of criticism by
the bar and scholars, the filing of dissenting and concurring opinions, as a means to improve
the majority opinion, as well as providing a forum for debate and accurate record of the
members' positions.).
102. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 210.
103. See O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 232.
104. See O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 137. O'Brien quotes John Marshall's philosophy:
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion which is
to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously submitted to the
consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of the reasoning be disapproved,
it must be so modified as to receive the approbation of all, before it can be deliv-
ered as the opinion of all.
Id. (quoting Philadelphia Union, April 24, 1819) (quoted by D. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM
JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 173 (1954)). The Taney Court also emphasized consensus.
See id. at 138.
105. See id. at 137-138.
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Collegial discussion and consensus are fine ideas for a court in
theory, but are hard to implement in practice. Lazarus' book
mentions both the personal and professional ill effects of ideologi-
cal disagreements on the Supreme Court. It is not necessarily true,
however, that personal relationships of ideologically opposed judges
need to degenerate to armed encampments or stony silences.
Judges with vastly different ideological views can interact fine
personally but disagree about the case law. Judges of similar
ideologies can find each other personally distasteful."°  The
problem is how to mediate the differences and to find consensus,
assuming that is the goal.
Lazarus' suggestions of working in good faith and caring about
reason more than results offers little practical help. In contrast to
his specific criticism of the reasoning of the particular cases, he
offers few concrete suggestions regarding how to bridge the gap.
Specific suggestions are hard to identify because there may not be
a middle ground for consensus on these issues. The problem he
sees is that few Justices want to compromise, and Lazarus is
unhappy with the results that the Court reaches under these
circumstances.
3. What if No One Wants to Compromise?-Sometimes no
middle ground exists for the Justices. The Justices care deeply and
feel strongly about their views concerning conflicting precedents
and policies. Yet, the losing side of the argument believes that if
the other side had just listened more carefully, the winners would
have found the loser's argument persuasive. There is a real
difference between listening and disagreeing and not listening.
Sometimes the other side has listened to and understood the
argument and may still disagree. They may not want to compro-
mise their principles.
Lazarus details many occasions in which the members of the
Court reviewed each other's drafts and attempted to reach
compromises. In the end, they simply disagreed. This disagree-
ment does not show a lack of good faith, but disagreement with the
approach or outcome of the other Justices. There comes a time to
"call the question" and vote. The paradox here is that if one
106. For example, Justice Douglas was reputed to be difficult to get along with, even for
those ideologically aligned. See JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 253-256 (noting Justice Douglas'
difficult personality and his strained personal relationships even with ideological soulmates).
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acknowledges that there is no "right answer," one has to accept the
problem that many approaches and results are acceptable, especial-
ly on topics that so deeply divide our society.
One has the feeling that it is not the process as much as the
substantive decisions reached that bother Lazarus. Lazarus does
not like the results that the Court reaches or the liberal Justices'
methodology. Yet he maintains a blind faith that the right result
will pop out if only the right process is used. But there is no proof
that a different process would produce better results, and certainly
Lazarus provides few practical examples of admirable Supreme
Court decision models.
Moreover, some disagreements do naturally solidify. Regard-
ing the death penalty cases, for example, "[o]n the long nights
when someone's life hung in the balance, or in the days that
followed, the Justices essentially never conferred with one anoth-
er.' 0 7 The votes of five justices were certain, and the other four
"made no attempt to join forces and steer the Court in con-
cert."' 8  While the conservative group set itself on limiting
appeals and speeding up the executions, the liberal side, in his view,
set itself on increasing congestion in the system and delaying
executions.
Lazarus is particularly critical of Brennan and Marshall on the
death penalty.0 9 Yet, as Lazarus points out "someone's life hung
in the balance," and surely Brennan and Marshall should be given
some latitude to stick with their dissents to the majority's approach.
Their conviction was based on their view of the death penalty in
every case; they did not feel it was wrong because in any given case
there was a mistake. It was a life or death issue. Their position
may have hardened the conservatives to an automatic response of
107. Id. at 129.
108. Id.
109. Lazarus states that:
Brennan and Marshall did not pretend that their abolitionist position could
be squared with the Court's precedents. Instead, they self-righteously excused
themselves from following stare decisis ... especially ones (as Gregg came to be)
that the Court repeatedly reaffirmed ....
Whatever the duo's justification, their acid stream of abolitionist dissents
ensured that the issue of capital punishment continually ate away at the connective
tissue of the Court community. After Gregg, the Court handed down a number
of decisions further restricting the death penalty. But every success for Brennan's





favoring imposition, but allowing several people to die to prove
that the Justices' could be flexible in their approaches may be
asking too much. No evidence exists that meeting and conferring
or conferences and discussions would have helped in these cases.
Both Blackmun and Powell converted to the idea that the death
penalty was unconstitutional, but Blackmun did so in his last days
on the court" ° while Powell did so after retirement. Both seem
to have converted as a result of their personal experiences with the
death penalty, rather than any legal arguments.
Lazarus appears to admire Blackmun's dissent in McClesky,
which found an equal protection violation in the imposition of the
death penalty, as a testament to Oliver Wendell Holmes adage that
"[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence":111
In sixteen years as a Justice, through thousands of cert.
petitions, hundreds of death penalty stays, and as Circuit Justice
overseeing the execution-eager Missouri Supreme Court,
Blackmun had developed an intimate acquaintance with the
viscera of the death penalty. With an unmatched meticulous-
ness, he had read, analyzed, annotated, and absorbed tens of
thousands of pages detailing the minute factual and legal details
of capital cases across the country. [Footnote omitted.] What
moved Blackmun to speak out (indeed almost shout) in
McClesky was not merely the thoroughness of the Baldus study
or his decidedly Yankee view of southern history but his
conviction born of experience that every day, in some court-
room across the South, race was playing a significant, perni-
cious, and unconstitutional role in the death penalty. The
Baldus study did not prove this to him; it simply confirmed
what Blackmun had come to know already.
112
Blackmun's ultimate position differed from the abolitionist
position of Brennan and Marshall perhaps only in the abolitionists'
willingness to draw a broader conclusion sooner from the plethora
of individual cases that all seemed pointed in the same direction,
rather than to continue on a laborious case-by-case basis in
deciding who would live and who would die. Conferences and
discussions have much less to do with this belief than long-held
ideologies and life experiences. The experience of being a Justice
110. Id. at 509.
111. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
112. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 214.
[Vol. 103:1
CLOSED CHAMBERS AND CLOSED MINDS
can change one's perspective, but the change is not necessarily the
result of discussions with other Justices.
Justice Blackmun provides another example. He provided the
crucial fifth vote in a case that raised the Tenth Amendment from
its grave-National League of Cities v. Usery.113 For ten years the
legal community tried to figure out what the National League of
Cities decision meant in leaving the states a "federal-free" zone in
certain areas of "traditional state functions." Then Justice
Blackmun tried to write another opinion on the same issue and he
became the fifth vote to overturn National League of Cities, based
on his experience in trying to design a workable standard to judge
those "traditional functions" of state government that should be
safe from federal encroachment." 4 Again, experience overruled
theory.
4. What if the Middle Ground Exists on Intellectual Quick-
sand?-Lazarus is most critical of the ideologues on both sides who
want to shift the law completely in the direction of their own
philosophy, regardless of precedent or their colleague's opinions.
But the two qualities that Lazarus focuses upon-open-mindedness
and intellectual integrity (both honesty and consistency)-may be
at odds with each other. To achieve more uniformity, to find
common ground, everyone has to stretch and bend their own truth.
That is how majorities are made and add more members. The
making of a majority may require the members of it to fudge their
rationales to accommodate the viewpoints of the other Justices.
Lazarus wants a process of engagement, but that process may end
up with less honesty and certainty, and fewer just results.
One of his prime examples-the death penalty-also illustrates
that this is not a new problem that crept into the 1988 term. As
Lazarus points out, the debate over abolition of the death penalty
was alive in the Warren era,115 reached a splintered consensus
with the Furman v. Georgia"6 opinion striking down the death
penalty,u 7 and then exploded again during the Rehnquist era.
113. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
114. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1986).
115. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 88.
116. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
117. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 106 (noting that the Furman opinions were the
"longest collection of opinions ever.").
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Lazarus criticizes the 5-4 Furman decision that struck down the
death penalty-a radical shift in the law-as weak, meandering, and
incoherent, and not based on the "shared language of principle, a
common understanding of where the law has been, where the law
should go, and how to travel the distance between.' ' 118  But the
question of the correct way to decide these tough cases is answered
with more platitudes and little insight. For example, Lazarus
compares the Furman failure with the Brown victory:
Gone was any effort toward accommodation or persuasion or
the felt need to deliver an opinion with a past and a future, and
not as individuals. Not one of the Justices in the majority
thought to reconsider his vote rather than march forward in
total disarray.n 9
Although he expresses admiration for harmonious decisions
like Brown, he also correctly criticizes the way some Justices took
a position without reasoning.2 ' Generally, there is some trade
off between intellectual consistency and consensus. Compromise
involves sacrificing principle. Lazarus acknowledges this problem,
but does not resolve it.' He limits the need for compromise to
the occasional or unusual case, with Brown as the paradigm. Given
the state of the ideological split that he details in his book, surely
this is an inaccurate assessment of the amount of compromise that
would have to occur. Uniformity or consensus may be achieved
only on highly volatile issues because the Justices feel that the
perception of a united front is necessary as in Brown or United
States v. Nixon,122 the case in which President Nixon suggested
that he would comply only with a unanimous decision.' 2 '
118. Id. at 109.
119. Id. at 110.
120. See id. at 290.
121. See id. at 322-23 ("A concern for the Court's external authority or for preserving
collegiality within the Court inevitably requires Justices, on occasion, to compromise in their
respective jurisprudences. Such compromises may be necessary, for example, to forge a
Court majority, or out of a respect for precedent, or to allow the Court, in an unusual case,
to speak with a single voice.").
122. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
123. The Justices working together as an institution to reach consensus in this manner
is rare, as Lazarus' book and others, suggest. David O'Brien notes:
The unanimous decision and opinion in United States v. Nixon were
exceptional. The justices have worked together to reach an institutional decision
and opinion in this way, Justice Brennan recalled, only two or three times in the
last thirty years. The trend is now to less consensus on the Court's rulings. The
justices tend to be increasingly divided over their decisions. Individual opinions
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Moreover, unanimity is not necessarily a worthwhile goal for
its own sake. Lazarus raises hope at the end of the book for more
consensus by citing the recent 9-0 decision in Clinton v. Jones.'24
That case held that a sitting President can be subjected to a civil
suit during his Presidency based on allegations of actions that
occurred before taking office. 25 Ironically, this example of the
Court speaking "with a single institutional voice" proves that
unanimity is no guarantee that a decision will be well-reasoned or
reach the right result. History will be the ultimate judge of the
correctness of that decision. Yet given the subsequent impeach-
ment of President Clinton that flowed from the civil case, the
Supreme Court may have been incorrect in unanimously asserting
that "[a]s for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District
Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial
amount of petitioner's [President Clinton's] time."' 26
Although a consensus based decision seems desirable to
Lazarus, by no means is it sufficient. Lazarus also criticizes Roe for
its "stunningly brief"'27 analysis, but it had seven joiners, includ-
ing conservative members of the Court. He admits that none of
the arguments that could have been made in Roe were "completely
persuasive," but thought that the Court should have tried, rather
than being swept away by "good intentions.' ' 128 He criticizes the
Court for building "the right house on the wrong land and [putting]
it up too quickly., 129  So, Lazarus likes the result, but cannot
defend the route to it. At least, however, the Justices built the
result in Roe as a collegial workforce and reached a consensus. But
nothing pleases Lazarus because he wants a consensus process to
lead to the results that he wants down the legal path he finds most
defensible. This is an impossible dream.
have become more highly prized than institutional opinions. The Court now
functions more like a legislative body relying simply on a tally of the votes to
decide cases than like a collegial body working toward collective decisions and
opinions.
O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 274.
124. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1998).
125. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 516 ("Also, in some recent rulings-for example the
Court's unanimous denial of President Clinton's claim of immunity from the Paula Jones
suit-the Justices have shown an ability, however rarely invoked, to set aside lurking
partisanship and speak with a single institutional voice.").
126. 520 U.S. at 1648.
127. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 366.
128. Id. at 366-67.
129. Id. at 371.
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In forging a majority and being collegial, a Justice could find
the common legal ground shaky. Lazarus is quick to claim that he
does not endorse the Justices coming together to form an opinion
that a majority can agree on if the principles involved are sacri-
ficed. Lazarus wants the Justices to move to the correct solution
based on principle, not back room bartering. He believes that a
correct decision would be reached if the Justices were consistent,
candid, and collegial in resolving their differences:
This is not simply a matter of finding the "vital center," so
much in vogue in today's political rhetoric. It is a matter of
finding ways to acknowledge and accommodate even our most
passionate differences, the ones where no common ground
exists. For the Justices, this process demands a strong measure
of empathy for opposing points of view and an emphasis on
their common commitment to the enterprise of the Court itself.
It means understanding when to stand on principle, when to put
a matter off, and when to simply yield. It means submerging
one's ideology and self expression beneath the Court's larger
duty to maintain clarity, coherence, and continuity in the
law. 130
After this inspirational passage, Lazarus leaves us only with
two hints of this ever occurring in the two centuries of the Court's
existence-in Chief Justice John Marshall's Court and in Chief
Justice Earl Warren's Court, more specifically the Brown v. Board
of Education decision. 131 The dearth of examples of Supreme
Court opinions that are in Lazarus' opinion acceptable, only shows
that it is difficult to find any Supreme Court opinions that do not
have some share of intellectual manipulation. Moreover, as noted
above, the Brown decision had its own problems with trade-offs,
political compromises, and maneuverings.
132
John Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison'33 is a
classically political and intellectually leaky opinion that is brilliant
in result.3 The issues are complex and not capable of easy
130. Id. at 9.
131. See id. at 9-10, 323.
132. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 323 ("Brown is a short, flat, and almost unexplained
opinion because, if Warren had crafted it any other way, he would have lost the grudging
concurrence of his colleague from Kentucky, Stanley Reed, who did not think much of the
ruling even in its bland form.").
133. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
134. See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1 (1969).
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resolution. That is what makes Justice Marshall's argument in
Marbury so disingenuous. Marshall argued that judicial review was
necessarily implied because it would be foolish to assume that the
Supreme Court should stand idly by if the Congress were to pass,
for example, a law declaring one witness or a private confession
enough to convict someone of treason. After all, the Constitution
expressly requires that, "no person shall be convicted of treason
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or
on confession in open court., 135 Yet he selected one of the few
examples in the Constitution in which easy resort to the text was
possible. Historically, the Supreme Court's job has been to
interpret more ambiguous phrasing such as "due process of law."
Marshall's subsequent decision in McCulloch v. Maryland13 6
interpreting the necessary and proper clause is a much better
example of the complex nature of the job.
Underlying Lazarus' process argument-the Justices should
work together in a common enterprise-is the theory that if
everyone just looked at the situation in a more intellectually honest
and collegial manner, they would come to his (the correct and
principled) point of view.137 It is at least as likely, however, that
a process of consensus decision-making, which involves "submerg-
ing one's ideology and self expression," '138 would produce incoher-
ent decisions.
5. The Problem With Appointing Centrists-Appointing
centrists appears to be a good solution because centrists eliminate
the problems of dealing with firmly held ideologies. Justice
Powell's biographer, for example, described Powell in a way that
seems the very essence of what Lazarus is looking for in a Supreme
Court jurist. Justice Powell approached his job as a "characteristic
[search] to narrow conflict, to accommodate opposing views, and
when not possible, to disagree without deepening divisions and
precluding future rapprochement." '139 He looked to the middle
to resolve disputes. Yet centrists may differ from the ideologues
135. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
136. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
137. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 71 (discussing one death penalty case as a "relatively
easy case" where the cases "virtually compelled the Court" to rule for the defendant, but
they split 4-4).
138. Id. at 9.
139. JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 561.
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only in that their guiding vision is less easy to discern. For
example, Justice Powell, seems to have been driven in his vision by
what he, intellectually and experientially, viewed as good social
policy. n Centrists may also have other problems. For example,
Powell was not a coalition builder. It was his view or separate
opinions. The result was that if a group needed Powell for a
majority, the majority's reasoning had to adapt to Powell's view
resulting in the production of doctrinally muddied and inconsistent
opinions.
For example, Justice Powell provided the swing vote in Plyler
v. Doe,4' striking down a Texas statute that denied a public
education to children of aliens illegally residing in the United
States.'42 In bringing Powell into the fold, Justice Brennan took
his original draft that was doctrinally coherent, but unacceptable to
Powell, and produced a doctrinally incoherent opinion that was
acceptable to Powell.'43
The Bakke' affirmative action decision is another illustra-
tion in which two sides took definitive positions, both of which
were legally more defensible than Powell's opinion that cast the
deciding vote on each of the major issues. Although a good
example of a politically appropriate compromise, the legal
reasoning left much to be desired.'45 Decisions held together by
coalitions will reflect the centrists' quirkiness or inconsistent
reasoning.
Lazarus expresses admiration for Justice Souter, who helped
hold the Court together during the Casey abortion crisis. Lazarus
does, however, give the reader enough facts of both the dissenting
and concurring opinions to know that the centrists, including
140. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 9; Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the
Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1854 (1995) (book review).
141. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
142. See id. at 230.
143. As one commentator noted:
What resulted was an opinion that on one level had almost no generative or
doctrinal significance because it involved too many considerations. On another
level, the opinion had profound doctrinal significance because one could interpret
it to hold that the Supreme Court will strike down statutes that are unconstitu-
tional when a majority of the Court thinks those statutes are unwise social policy.
Powell's jurisprudence produced an opinion that was almost nothing more than a
direct reflection of his views of social policy.
Tushnet, supra note 148, at 1873.
144. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
145. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 9, at 469-73, 484.
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Souter, could be justly criticized for the hypocrisy of a compromise
that allowed Roe to be re-affirmed in theory and reversed when
applied.t4 6  Lazarus also acknowledges the role of the centrists
such as the troika of Stevens, Powell, and Stewart in the post-
Furman furor in Gregg, when some of the Justices tried to undo
Furman.47
As the system becomes increasingly polarized, choosing
moderates may be the only route to confirmation through a Senate
divided by ideological debates about the death penalty, abortion,
and affirmative action. Many of the Justices possess highly political
backgrounds'n8-partisanship is in all honesty a prerequisite in
many cases to appointment149-and submergence of those back-
grounds may be difficult. A tension exists between the reality of
a political background and the attempt to suppress it in opinion
writing to appear more nonpartisan in keeping with the image of
the judiciary. Yet the Bork and Thomas confirmation hearings may
have made Presidents more cautious in their choices because of the
Senate, causing more moderates to be appointed, and toning down
the Court.' It remains to be seen whether this might have the
necessary leavening effect on the extreme partisanship that Lazarus
146. See generally Tushnet, supra note 148.
147. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 116-17. With regard to the death penalty generally,
he says, "[Clertainly Stevens and Blackmun considered themselves absolutely scrupulous in
what cases they voted to stay and hold--conscientious in their effort to make the death
penalty as fair and rational as possible." Id. at 159.
148. See RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESS 110-111 (1994).
149. This proposition was acknowledged by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990):
Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle that party
membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation of government jobs,
except those jobs for the performance of which party affiliation is an "appropriate
requirement." It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what that exception
means, but if there is any category of jobs for whose performance party affiliation
is not an appropriate requirement, it is the job of being a judge, where partisan-
ship is not only unneeded but positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that a
federal administration of one party will appoint a judge from another party. And
it has always been rare. Thus, the new principle that the Court today announces
will be enforced by a corps of judges (the Members of this Court included) who
overwhelmingly owe their office to its violation. Something must be wrong here,
and I suggest it is the Court.
Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted).
150. See Ronald Stidman, et al., The Voting Behavior of President Clinton's Judicial
Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996) ("President Clinton sought ideologically moderate
judges. Not surprisingly, the decisions of his appointees overall also have been moderate.").
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argues infected the Court during his term as well as other terms
and whether the opinions will become more principled or just
moderately quirky.
Choosing only political moderates or centrists is not a route
that Lazarus recommends, 5' because he does not believe having
an ideology is inconsistent with being either open minded or
intellectually honest, and he acknowledges the problems of
idiosyncratic views. Lazarus claims neither that the Court should
necessarily be composed of centrists nor that only moderates be
appointed, but that its activist and ideological judges need to
respect "reason, consistency, and principle." 52 That leads us back
to the problem of how to find middle ground, which is unresolved.
In the end, Lazarus provides no examples of good judicial
behavior and reasoning. The reason may be that there is often a
trade-off between honesty and consensus, and it is difficult-especi-
ally in the controversial issues areas that he discusses-to find to
the contrary. The Justices come to the Court with many life
experiences and viewpoints. Although they may profess to honestly
read the briefs, to listen to the arguments, and to debate their
colleagues with an open mind, it is not surprising that many of their
opinions in these controversial areas have been determined by time
and life experience.
IV. Proposing A Solution
As Lazarus' story unfolds, a pattern emerges. He: (1)
carefully articulates the polar approaches in an area, (2) criticizes
both sides, and (3) then urges Court member to engage in more
careful and sincere deliberation, with an eye toward production of
"well-reasoned and persuasive explanations for their decisions."' 53
To get from step two to step three requires an unspecified leap of
faith.
Lazarus offers no concrete reforms to achieve a more intellec-
tually honest Court that works towards consensus. No great
changes are proposed, no constitutional amendments are suggested,
and no commissions are to be created to deal with what the book
jacket describes as the "tragic failings" of the modern Court. At
the end of the book, he proposes that the solution lies with the
151. See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 420, 515-17.
152. Id. at 517.
153. Id. at 422.
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"souls" of the Justices, and their ability to renounce their arro-
gance. His most important qualities for future Supreme Court
Justices are "open-mindedness and intellectual integrity.'
1 54
Who would openly disagree that these are important qualities?
These qualities-intellectual honesty and collegiality-are often
bantered about as admirable goals for the judicial system. These
qualities are popular, in part, because everyone can claim allegiance
to them while simultaneously accusing others of betraying those
values, a point Lazarus recognizes. The problem is that neither
Justice Brennan nor Scalia (two of the classic culprits in Lazarus'
mind) would see it that way-"Yes, I need to be more open-
minded and develop more intellectual integrity." Given the nature
of the book, which is highly critical of many of the Justices, it may
not inspire further soul searching on the Justices' part.
Good reason exists not to suggest any institutional reforms.
Any formal reform of the Court system has to take into account
the political process through which those reforms must pass. Yet
the current polarized political process is at fault in many ways for
the situation that currently exists at the Court. Any reforms would
likely barnacle even more politics on to the process. People who
want to quit smoking probably will not find much help at a tobacco
company. So too, a judiciary in need of de-politicization should not
seek reform through the legislative process. Lazarus dates many of
the conflicts on the current court to the Bork confirmation
debacle-in which the liberals tasted blood and the conservatives
vowed revenge.155 The politically intense turned their efforts to
154. Id. at 518. On the Bork confirmation, Lazarus also criticizes the liberal and
conservative camps for their no-holds-barred defense of their positions. See id. at 243-44.
Professor Lawrence Tribe took a similar position with regard to the abortion dispute,
pleading for more listening and understanding of the other side's position, and removing the
issue from politics. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
155. Lazarus states:
Skewering Bork on the issue of privacy ushered in the era of 'stealth' nominees,
during which a chief qualification for the Court became a lack of public comment
coupled with a denial of private comment on Roe v. Wade, the most disputed case
of the modem era. The Bork experience also established intense political
campaigning and special interest lobbying as a fixed part of the nomination
process. Such truth-twisting campaigning made a casualty of candor in the
selection of life-tenured appointees to our highest court. The lobbying ate away
the thin but crucial divide between law and politics'-the public belief that the
Supreme Court is not merely another political institution and that judges can and
should stand above the expedient trade offs of the day.
LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 248. Earlier in his book, Lazarus noted that "[i]n my view, that
nomination fight-full of deceptions on both sides-unleashed yet a new level of rancor and
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the judiciary and found that the third branch responded to political
pressure. Lazarus attributes some of the conflict he found on the
Court to the "fight to the death" strategies employed by both sides
and later employed at the Court among some clerks and Justices.
Tinkering with the structure of the system threatens the
independence of the judiciary, an independent evil, because the
legislative political process will be set in motion. The politicized
nature of the Supreme Court appointment process is already a
concern for Lazarus.1 16 In the end, it is difficult to suggest any
institutional reform to deal with judges who stretch the law too far
at any level of the system. At least one study suggests that the best
check within the federal appellate system is mixed panels of
appointees from political parties. 157 Apparently whistle blowers
can keep abuses in check. This approach may work less well at the
Supreme Court level because there is no one to run to "tell on" the
offending judge, whereas the Supreme Court provides the dissent-
ing tattletales at the federal appeals level with an occasional
hearing. The presence of dissenting opinions on the Supreme
Court that vigorously point out the flaws in the majority's reason-
ing may serve the same function as will critical analysis of the
Court's opinions from outside the Court.
V. Conclusion
Many readers of Lazarus' book who are familiar with the field
of constitutional law will be as "shocked" by the stories as the
police officer in Casablanca was upon finding gambling going on at
Rick's gin joint. The accusation of political and unprincipled
decision making Lazarus levels at the Supreme Court is not
headline news. Many of the same criticisms are in other books and
law review articles, some with different slants, but most without the
gossip. Lazarus' book is more controversial, however, because of
his former position of trust at the Court.
self-destructiveness in the nation's legal culture generally and at the Court in particular."
Id. at 13.
156. See id. at 243-44.
157. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156
(finding that "the presence of a judge whose policy preferences differ from the majority's and
who will expose the majority's manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine (if
such manipulation or disregard were needed to reach the majority's preferred outcome)-is
a significant determinant of whether judges will perform their designated role as principled
legal decisionmakers.").
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CLOSED CHAMBERS AND CLOSED MINDS
Lazarus book is also likely to confirm the Justices' worst fears
about opening up their doors and send them scurrying to seal all
exits in the clerks' code of ethics. If other clerks or Justices
responded in kind to Lazarus' Mommie Dearest158 style memoir,
it would be highly destructive to the Court's processes, something
that Lazarus professes to care deeply about. Ironically, with this
book, Lazarus himself seems to have gone nuclear in the guerrilla
war he condemns at the Court. Moreover, if Lazarus succeeds in
making the Supreme Court's decision making process a topic of
public debate, it may make the Court even more the target of the
same political processes that have a negative effect on its internal
workings. That the Justices do not always act in an intellectually
honest manner is an open secret. That the Justices are not ever
political is a legal fiction that helps the institution function with
only minor attention from the openly political actors in the
legislative and executive branches. Once we do away with that
fiction, however, the Supreme Court could become a much more
visible prize for capture.
Lazarus is not cynical and believes the Court can fix its flaws.
His prescription of encouraging a more collegial atmosphere and
intellectual open-mindedness reflects a faith in the process that
history may not justify and political appointment procedures do not
encourage. Beyond providing fairly routine criticisms of the
Court's reasoning in a number of areas, the book fails to deliver
any substantial suggestions for change. Instead, Lazarus advocates
diffuse goals for the system that are neither reconcilable nor proven
effective.
158. CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE DEAREST (1978) (scathing memoir of Joan
Crawford by her daughter).
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